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STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS
In reply to the Brief of Respondent, Defendant Crestani
submits the following facts to correct misstatements or supply
omissions necessary for a full understanding of this case:
1.

In this case, Defendant Crestani was charged with

stealing money from the commercial bank account known as MMD-2 on
four separate occasions over a three-month period from May 7 to
August 13, 1982.
was $57,300.002.

The total amount alleged to have been stolen
(R. 23).

Originally, the State alleged that the four withdrawals

made by Crestani were unlawful because all of the money deposited
into MMD-2 was escrow money belonging to the customers of Alta
Title Company.
3.

(R. 23).

At trial, however, substantial evidence was introduced

establishing that MMD-2 was, from its inception, used to maintain
funds other than escrow monies and that the account at various
times contained personal funds of the Defendant Crestani as well
as funds belonging to Alta Title Company.

This point is conceded

in Respondent's Brief in the first paragraph on page 4.
4.
stolen

No particular victim or rightful owner of the allegedly
funds

was

ever

identified

by

the

prosecution.

(T. 198-200).
5.

MMD-2 was an active account for the lS-month period

ending in March, 1983. The State introduced at trial the monthly

account statements and individual checks and deposit items for
MMD-2 for only the period February, 1982, through October, 1982.
(Plaintiff's Exhibits 11 and 17 through 24).
6.

In an attempt to show that the Defendant's withdrawal

of money caused a financial loss, the State introduced evidence
that when MMD-2 closed in March, 1983, Alta Title's underwriter
paid approximately $125,000.00 to $150,000.00 due to losses in
MMD-2 (T. 57, 58).

However, since no bank records were in-

troduced showing what happened to MMD2 during the five-month
period from November, 1982, to March, 1983, no evidence was
available at trial directly connecting four charged withdrawals
with the losses in March, 1983.
7.

At trial, the State did not provide any audit or

accounting of the MMD-2 account over its entire 13-month existence.

The only analysis of what happened in that account

offered in the State's case in chief was through the testimony of
Roger Piburn, a former employee of Alta Title Company (T.
138-163).

Mr. Piburn testified that in November, 1982, he

performed a review of deposits into and disbursements out of
MMD-2 for the period February, 1982, through October, 1982.

(T.

144, 190).
8.

Mr. Piburn testified only from memory about his review

conducted some five years earlier and he produced no notes,
memoranda or records of his review of the account
9.

(T. 168).

On the first day of trial, Mr. Piburn testified that he

couldn't recall any of Defendant Crestani's personal monies being
-2-

in MMD-2

(T. 146, 194). The next day, Mr. Piburn testified that

he did recall that Defendant Crestani had personal funds in MMD-2
(T. 242).

However, Mr. Piburn could not recall any specific

deposit of Mr. Crestani1s.
10.

(T. 243).

Contrary to Mr. Piburn's testimony (T. 144, 242), the

MMD-2 account was not consistently overdrawn.

In fact, the

account was never in an overdraft status from its inception until
the end of October (Plaintiff's Exhibits 11 and 20-24) and the
overdraft disclosed by the October statement was in the amount of
only $2,854.95.

That is some Fifty-four Thousand Dollars

($54,000.00) less than the alleged loss from the Crestani
withdrawals.

The records for the account show that none of the

withdrawals charged to the Defendant caused an overdraft in the
account.
11.

(Exhibits 20P, 21P and IIP).
The record does not disclose that trial counsel made a

Motion to Dismiss at the close of the State's case.
12.

Had trial counsel called the witness Blake Hammond from

Phoenix to testify, Mr. Hammond would have testified that in late
February or March, 1983, Mr. Piburn stated in front of other
witnesses that he had not performed any reconciliation of MMD-2
(R. 201).
13.

After sentencing in this case, in the two-week period

between the hearings on Defendant's motion for a new trial on
October 26, 1987 and November 12, 1987, the CPA hired by newcounsel for Mr. Crestani performed a review of the entire MMD-2
account as well as several other accounts maintained by Alta
-3-

Title Co. and Mr. Crestani.

The two reports generated by the CPA

from this review are attached hereto as Addendum Exhibits "A" and
"B".
14.

The CPA discovered several deposits of Mr. Crestani1s

personal funds into MMD-2 which were not known to trial counsel
or mentioned at trial.
15.

The CPA discovered one deposit made on June 28, 1982,

in the amount of $24,622.50.

The CPA further found that these

funds were still in the account and available to cover the
$16,500.00 withdrawal on August 13, 1982, which was the basis of
Count IV of the Information.

Both Mr. Crestani and Raymond Fry

have confirmed that the deposited funds were owed to Mr. Crestani
personally. (R. 266, 252-254).
16.

In addition, the CPA located a deposit of Mr.

Crestanifs personal funds in the amount of $50,000.00, made by
Mr. Crestani's attorney on August 5, 1982 (Exhibit "A" at p.4).
The CPA discovered that this deposit was intended by Mr. Crestani
to go into MMD-2, but unknown to Mr. Crestani, was deposited into
another account by mistake (Id.).

The accountant discovered that

these funds were never withdrawn up to the time that Alta Title
closed in March, 1983 (Id.).
17.

The CPA also discovered that in 1982, Mr. Crestani had

available to him in the bank accounts of Alta Title over
$500,000.00 of personal funds from the sale of the Alta Title
building (Exhibit "B" at p.2). The CPA further found that
because of the numerous deposits into MMD-2 from the various Alta
-4-

Title bank accounts, many of which could have been part of the
above-described

$500,000 or other funds belonging

to Mr,

Crestani, a determination of whether or not other funds were
available to cover to the withdrawals charged in this case would
require a review of all Alta's accounts (Id.).

The CPA!s report

Because there were over $4,400,000 in deposits into the MMD-2 account classified as
"repurchase agreement11 funds, and multiple
transfers from the general Alta account and
the MMD1 account, and many transfers from the
MMD-2 account into the Valley Bank escrow
account, a full and complete accounting of
all transactions must be made before anyone
can answer [the question of whether or not
Crestani had funds in the MMD-2 account to
cover the charged withdrawals] accurately.
This has never been done. (Exhibit ffBff at
pp.2-3. Emphasis in original).
18.

The CPA also discovered numerous deposits of Crestanifs

personal funds into MMD-2 subsequent to the date of the last
charged offense.

The CPAfs report states that because of time

constraints, they were not able to obtain adequate documentation
from the other deposits to include them in his report. (Exhibit
"A" at p.4).
19.

The CPA also found that when he showed Mr. and Mrs.

Crestani the full records of the MMD-2 account, their memories
were prompted with regard to the details of specific transactions
(Exhibit MA"at p.l). The CPA reports that the Crestanis were
able to recall events surrounding the four charged withdrawals
which, because they did not have the documents,
able to recall at trial.

\.m A .

(Exhibit "A" at pp.2-4).
-5-
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they were not

20.

The cash withdrawals referred to on page 7 of Respon-

dents Brief which Mr, Piburn testified Mr, Crestani made and
"placed in his pocket" were not withdrawals from MMD-2, but were
from the Alta Title General Fund account (T. 251).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The requisite showing of prejudice to Defendant Crestani!s
case is made out by the evidence that trial counsel's lack of
preparation and his incomplete factual investigation left him
completely ignorant of facts providing a complete defense to
count IV of the information and arguably good and sufficient
defenses to the remaining counts.

Trial counsel was unaware of

many of the deposits of Defendant Crestani's personal monies into
MMD-2 both before and after the charged withdrawals and he was
further ignorant of the facts and circumstances surrounding the
deposits that were relied upon by the defense at trial.
Trial counsel's lack of understanding

of the case also

prevented him from making a motion to dismiss which should have
been made and probably would have been granted at the close of
the State's case.

Further, trial counsel's Ignorance caused him

unwittingly to supply a missing element of tljie State's proof.
Defense counsel's unprofessional conduct which deprived
Defendant Crestani of exonerating evidence cannot be excused as
sound trial strategy.

Since trial counsel completely failed in

his duty to carefully investigate the facts of the case, his
tactical decisions were the result of inadequate preparation and
therefore lacked a rational basis.
-6-

Trial counsel's failures to object to the admission of
irrelevant and prejudicial evidence at trial were the result, not
of trial strategy, but of ignorance and negligence.
Respondent's argument that Instructions 16 and 25 were
!f

helpfuln or "clarifying" instructions is completely refuted by a

careful reading of both instructions.
Notwithstanding the abandonment of the terms "general and
specific

intent11, in Utah's

statutory

scheme, Defendant

Crestani's proposed intent instructions were improperly denied
because the instructions given by the Court did not clearly
explain that the required mental state was a separate element of
the crime.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
TRIAL COUNSEL'S PREPARATION AND TRIAL OF
THIS CASE FELL BELOW THE CONSTITUTIONAL
STANDARD AND RESULTED IN SEVERE
PREJUDICE TO DEFENDANT CRESTANI'S CASE
Against the overwhelming evidence of trial counsel's lack of
preparation and factual investigation presented in Appellant's
Brief, the State sets up only a few "straw man"

arguments which

simply ignore the thrust and substance of this appeal.
Most assuredly, Defendant Crestani bases this appeal on the
violation of his right to effective assistance of counsel secured
by article I sections VII and XII of the Utah Constitution and by
the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution.

Meaningfully applied, that right includes the
-7-

opportunity to receive effective aid of counsel in the preparation and trial of the case.

People v. Douglas, 61 Cal. 2d 430,

434, 392 P.2d 964, 38 Cal. Rptr. 884 (1964); People v. Carter, 66
Cal. 2d 666, 669, 427 P.2d 214, 58 Cal. Rptr. 614 (1967).
According to Utah law, the threshold inquiry in a case
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel is whether or not the
conduct of trial counsel prejudiced the defendant's case.
v. Archuleta, 747 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1987).

State

The parties agree that

prejudice is established by affirmatively showing that a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the trial result would have been different.
Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986).

State v.

(Br. of Resp. p.14.)

This standard, adopted from Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984), is less restrictive than the
"farce and sham11 standard previously used by Utah Courts (See
State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d 203 (Utah 1976)).

Under the modern

standard, a defendant need not show that counsel's deficient
conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case,
Strickland at 683, 104 S.Ct at 2067, but only the existence of a
reasonable probability that the result would have been different.
Respondent acknowledges that prejudice is established where
the conduct of trial counsel "probably resulted in the forfeiture
of a substantial defense."

(Br. of Resp. p.17, quoting Common-

wealth v. Sellon, 402 N.E.2d 1329, (Mass. 1980)).
However, Respondent baldly and incorrectly asserts that:
"Defendant does not assert he lost a substantial defense nor that
-8-

'any issue of law or fact could have but was not exploited by
counsel for the Defendant's benefits1lf (Br, of Resp. p. 17,
citations omitted)•
In fact, Defendant Crestani has repeatedly and strongly
asserted that because of trial counsel's inadequate preparation,
he lost an absolute defense to count IV of the information.

In

addition, the true facts of Defendant's financial situation, his
numerous deposits into MMD-2 both before and after the charged
withdrawals, and, the true facts and circumstances surrounding
some of the contested deposits were kept from the jury because of
trial counsel's failure to obtain and review with Defendant and
the other witnesses the relevant account records.
The clearest prejudice results from trial counsel's failure
to identify the $24,000.00 deposit of June 28, 1982.

Against

this powerful piece of evidence, Respondent can only point out
that the CPA did not establish, as of course he could not have
established, the personal source of the loan to Raymond Fry.
However, Respondent ignores the evidence submitted to the trial
court that both Defendant Crestani and Mr. Fry identified the
loan as having come from personal funds of Defendant Crestani.
(R. 266, 253). More importantly, however, trial counsel was
completely ignorant of this transaction, which a thorough review
of MMD-2 and even an adequate interrogation of his own client
would surely have revealed.

It is solely because of trial

counsel's constitutionally inadequate preparation for trial that

-9-

this evidence and the complete defense it would have provided was
lost to Defendant Crestani.
Additional evidence of trial counsel's ignorance of the case
is found in the fact that the CPA, in going over the MMD-2
account records with Defendant and his witnesses, was given
reasonable explanations for the charged withdrawals that were not
presented at trial.

Contrary to the assertions of Respondent's

Brief, this evidence is not presented here to "show that Defendant lacked the requisite intent" (Br. of Resp. p.15).

This

evidence is submitted to show that adequate investigation and
preparation would have discovered additional important evidence
and testimony helpful to the defense that should have been heard
by the jury.

The fact that it was not severly prejudiced

Defendant's case.

POINT II
TRIAL COUNSEL FURTHER PREJUDICED DEFENDANT
CRESTANI'S CASE BY FAILING TO PERCEIVE A
FATAL WEAKNESS IN THE STATE'S CASE.
The legal case constructed against Defendant Crestani at
trial was remarkably weak.

The prosecution's case was originally

based upon the flawed premise that MMD-2 was exclusively an
escrow account.

When it became clear at trial that an MMD-2 was

also used, before and after the alleged thefts, as a depository
for Defendant Crestani's personal funds, as well as funds of Alta
Title over which he would have had authority, the State's case
was left with a glaring deficiency.
-10-

The State's case was suddenly without any proof that the
Defendant Crestani did not withdraw his own funds or funds he
believed to be his own.

The $2,800.00 overdraft in the account

in October was insufficient

to demonstrate the theft of

$57,000.00, and, because of the gap in the bank record evidence
between October 1982 and March 1983, there was no evidence to tie
the Crestani withdrawals to the $150,000.00 loss that occurred
when the account was closed.
Because trial counsel was largely ignorant of the history of
the account, he failed, at the close of the State's evidence, to
move to dismiss the State's case for failure to prove the
elements of lack of authority and intent to permanently deprive.
Instead, he took on the burden of disproving that which the State
has failed to prove in the first place by introducing evidence of
deposits which he thought would have covered the charged
withdrawals.
However, because trial counsel had failed to subpoena the
records of disbursements from MMD-2, both he and his woefully
unprepared witnesses were unaware that the few deposits for which
they had records had been disbursed from the account prior to the
charged withdrawals.

He also tested the jury's credulity by

having Mrs. Crestani testify to huge deposits for which they
could produce no records.
Though the prosecutor was apparently also unaware of the
deposits of Crestani's personal funds in MMD-2, he was able,
during an overnight recess, to locate the disbursement records
-11 -

that deprived the defense evidence of any probative force.

The

Crestani1s, unprepared as they were for this unexpected evidence,
could offer no explanation.

Then, through his questioning and in

his closing argument, the prosecutor used this monumental defense
error to supply the very evidence of lack of authority that was
otherwise lacking in his own case.

The prosecutor was able to

say to the jury, in essence, if Mr. Crestani had authority to
withdraw these funds, he and his wife would not have had to try
to "pull the wool over" the jury's eyes by inventing bogus
deposits or claiming deposits covered the withdrawals when they
knew full well the deposits either did not exist or had been
withdrawn before the thefts.
Trial counsel's ignorance of the facts and failure of
preparation and the devastating effect achieved by the prosecution in pointing out those defects to the jury can be confirmed
by even a brief review of the record.
After suddenly being told she would be a witness for her
husband three days into the trial, Vicki Crestani took the stand
and was asked immediately to confirm a deposit of Defendant
Crestani1s personal funds into MMD-2 in the amount of $15,000.00.
(T. 408-410).

The next day, on cross examination, the prosecutor

confronted her with the damning evidence that she herself had
withdrawn the $15,000.00 deposit at the same time it was put into
MMD-2.

The following exchange occurred between the prosecutor

and Mrs. Crestani:

-12-

Mr. Bown:

So you knew that money
was out of that account
when you testified about
that $15,000.00?

Mrs. Crestani: No.
Mr. Bown:

I did not.

You didn't recall that he
told you to take the
$15,000.00 out until just
now?

Mrs. Crestani: No sir, not until I was
shown this document.
(T. 472)
As a further example, on direct examination, trial counsel
tried to get Mrs. Crestani to establish, from memory without
benefit of deposit documents, two $100,000.00 deposits into MMD-2
(T. 419). The ineptness of this defense tactic was emphasized by
numerous foundational

objections which caused

considerable

embarrassment because Mrs. Crestani was unable to recall the
dates of the deposits except within a general time frame of
"mid-1982.11

(T. 419-421)

Trial counsel then attempted to have Mrs. Crestani explain
why no documents were available to prove the existence of the
deposits and the following exchange occurred:
Mr. Hansen:

And were there
documentations of these
amounts?

Mrs. Crestani: In these-Mr. Hansen:

Of the hundred and the
hundred?

Mrs. Crestani: Yes, there are documents.

Mr. Hansen:

And do you have access to
them?

Mrs. Crestani: No, I'm sorry, we don't.
Mr. Hansen:

Can you tell me where
they are?
Mrs. Crestani: I believe those are with
attorneys, with the Alta
Title attorneys, our
personal attorneys.
They are not in our
possession.
(T. 421, 422)
Trial counsel did not attempt to explain to the jury why, if
these crucial documents were in the possession of the Crestanis'
own attorneys, they were not produced at trial.
On cross examination, the prosecutor repeatedly asked Mrs.
Crestani if she could find either of the $100,000.00 deposits in
the MMD-2 bank statements.

(T. 423, 424)

Mrs. Crestani had to

admit that she had not previously looked for those deposits (T.
424).

The prosecutor then pointedly highlighted the frailty of

Mrs. Crestani's testimony:
Mr. Bown:

You don't know?

Mrs. Crestani: But the loan document
was for $100,000.00.
Mr. Bown:

That's all you know?

Mrs. Crestani: I know that the loan was
for $100,000.00.
Mr. Bown:
How long have you known
about that loan?
Mrs. Crestani: I knew about it when it
was taken out.
-14-

Mr. Bown:

You still haven't found
that on the MMD-2? You
can't pinpoint it to any
specific—

Mrs. Crestani: I have only looked
through this particular
one. I can look through
these others.
I don't see one for
exactly $100,000.00
deposit.
Mr. Bown:

Okay. So, you are just
relying on your memory to
say it went into MMD-2?

Mrs. Crestani: No.
Mr. Bown:

I believe it did.

You are relying on your
memory?

Mrs. Crestani: Yes.
(T. 425)
The prejudice to the defense case of this devastating
sequence of trial events, caused solely by trial counsel's
inadequate preparation, is painfully clear.
POINT III
TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURES AMOUNTED TO
CONSTITUTIONALLY INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
AND CANNOT BE CALLED SOUND TRIAL STRATEGY.
It is difficult to understand Respondent's argument that,
even if prejudice was established, trial counsel's conduct can be
dismissed as "sound trial strategy."

(Br. of Resp. at p.17).

One wonders what possible sound trial strategy would encompass a
defense attorney's decision to withhold from the jury exonerating
evidence.
-15-

It is not difficult to perceive why Respondent asserts this
argument.

Tactical trial decisions are usually insulated from

appellate Msecond guessing."

Layton City v. Noon, 736 P.2d 1035

(Utah App. 1987); State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d 203, 205 (Utah
1976).

People v. Frierson, 25 Cal. 3d 142, 599 P.2d 587 58 Cal.

Rptr. 281 (1979).
However, courts have pointed out that:
Even tactical decisions may demonstrate incompetence
if made without the benefit of f substantial factual
inquiry. Frierson, supra, citing In re Saunders,
2 Cal. 3rd 1033, 1048-1049, 472 P.2d 921, 88 Cal. Rptr.
633 (1970).
Respondent's Brief ignores the fact that the constitutional
guarantee of effective assistance of counsel imposes a ,fduty on
defense attorneys to investigate carefully all defenses of fact
and law that may be available to the Defendant, and that this
duty to investigate requires that counsel gather as much information as possible about the case."

Barber v. Municipal Court,

24 Cal. 3d 742, 598 P.2d 818, 157 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1979).
When confronted with the claim that trial counsel's apparently unprofessional conduct was "sound trial strategy", an
appellate court must decide "whether counsel's actions were the
result of informed judgment or constitutionally
preparation."

inadequate

Stough v. State, 618 P.2d 301 (Hawaii 1980).

Trial tactics can never be called sound when counsel fails
to make a substantial factual inquiry into the specifics of his
client's defense.

Indeed, other courts have reversed convictions

where trial counsel's inaction deprives him of a rational basis
-16-

upon which to reach informed tactical and strategic decisions.
See People v. Frierson, supra.
In the instant case, trial counsel failed to make the
careful factual investigation necessary for a constitutionally
adequate defense.

He entered the trial completely ignorant of a

large amount of factual information necessary for an understanding of his client's defense.
adequate counsel.

As such, he could not function as

Whatever tactical and strategic decisions he

made were without rational basis and, by definition, wholly
unsound.

No such unprofessional conduct can meet the constitu-

tional standard of effective assistance of counsel.
In addition, trial counsel's conduct was constitutionally
deficient in another respect.

For nearly two years trial counsel

avoided any contact or communication with his client.

Only on

the literal eve of trial was Defendant Crestani able to discuss
some of the factual defenses and evidence necessary to defend the
case with trial counsel.
A meaningful discussion with one's client of the realities
of the client's case is as important to the concept of constitutionally effective assistance of counsel as the informed evaluation of potential defenses.
805 (11th Cir. 1982).

Goodwin v. Balkom, 684 F.2d 794,

cert, den., 460 U.S. 1098 (1983).

v. Hopper, 575 F.2d 1147, 1149-50 (5th Cir. 1978).

Gaines

Adequate

consultation between an attorney and the client is an essential
element of competent representation of a criminal defendant.
United States v. Tucker, 716 F.2d 576, 581 (9th Cir. 1983).
-17-

While the amount of consultation required will depend on the
facts of each case, the "consultations should be sufficient to
determine all legally relevant information known to the Defendant.ff

Ld.

See also, U.S. ex rel Cross v. DeRobertis, 661 F.

Supp. 683 (N.D. 111. 1986).
Where trial counsel's representation was so obviously
deficient in both investigation of factual defenses and consultation with his client, there is little question that his conduct
fell far below the constitutional standard.

POINT IV
TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO PREVENT THE
ADMISSION OF IRRELEVANT AND PREJUDICIAL
EVIDENCE PREJUDICED DEFENDANT'S CASE.
In its Brief, Respondent attempts to defend the manner in
which the civil statute, Exhibit 30-p, was received into evidence.

Of course, this event was but one of several raised by

Defendant Crestani to illustrate trial counsel's ineffectiveness
caused by lack of preparation and lack of understanding of the
case.
On the last day of trial, trial counsel recalled witness
Gary Carlson apparently for the sole purpose of establishing that
out-of-state partnerships had to have individuals rather than
corporations as their registered agents and therefore, Mr.
Crestani and not Alta Title was necessarily the recipient of the
$50.00 partnership fees. (T. 491-495).

Trial counsel himself was

apparently confused about the difference between Mr. Crestanifs
-18-

status as a title insurance agent and agent for the partnerships.
In his effort to clarify the point he picked up Exhibit 30-p,
which had not been admitted, and began questioning Mr. Carlson
about the statute for the sole purpose of showing that it did not
apply in the case.

The Court, and not trial counsel, insisted

that the statute be admitted if trial counsel were going to
question the witness about it.

Trial counsel attempted to limit

the purpose for which the civil statute was admitted but the
Court denied his motion.

(T. 493).

Later, counsel tried to object because the civil statute in
question did not relate to Mr. Crestanifs partnership agency.
The following exchange occurred:
Mr. Hansen:

I object to that because
it refers to this statute
which is not the
partnership act that we
are talking about with
Mr. Crestani. This is
to issue title insurance
policies.

The Court

The fact remains that
Mrs. Crestani testified
that Mr. Crestani is a
title insurance agent.

Mr. Hansen:

Well, that's true. But
the evidence as to the
$50.00 that were—

The Court

We're talking about the
dealings of an agent.
The objection is
overruled.

(T. 496)

-19-

Shortly thereafter Mr. Bown began questioning Mr. Carlson
about the requirement in the civil statute that interest earned
on trust account monies be paid to the customer and not the
agency.

(T. 496, 497). This line of questioning, allowed by the

Court presumably because the civil statute was in evidence, was
reemphasized in Mr. Bown's closing argument and in Instruction
No. 16.

This highly irrelevant and prejudicial evidence, which

had nothing to do with the theft charges, ought to have been
excluded.

Trial counsel, in fact, never objected to any of the

misappropriation of interest

evidence.

Defendant

Crestani

submits that this was not the result of trial strategy but
negligence.

POINT V
THE GIVING OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 16 AND 25 WAS
MISLEADING, PREJUDICIAL AND CONTRARY TO LAW.
In its Brief, Respondent defends both jury instructions 16
and 25 on the ground that they were
element of unauthorized control.ff

ff

relevant to prove the

(Br. of Resp. at p.26)

Aside

from the fact that jury instructions are not proof and a
relevance standard does not apply, these two challenged instructions were improper because they do not correctly state the
law applicable to the evidence received at trial.
Part of Instruction No. 16, the verbatim selected portions
of the civil statute referred to above, would have been proper
under the prosecution1 s original theory of the case.

Had the

money in MMD-2 been only escrow monies, the first paragraph of
-20-

Instruction 16 would have been proper to define the restrictions
on Defendant Crestanifs use of those monies.

But because MMD-2

was shown to contain Defendant Crestanifs own money and Defendant
Crestani did not claim that he had any authority to use escrowed
funds, Instruction No. 16 became irrelevant to the case.
Even if, for the purposes of argument, the first paragraph
of Instruction No. 16 could be considered proper to emphasize a
lack of authority that Defendant Crestani never asserted he had,
the second paragraph dealing with the restrictions on the use of
interest from the account was absolutely prejudicial and
irrelevant.

Interestingly, the second paragraph of Instruction

No. 16 was selectively lifted from among the other provisions of
Utah Code Ann. § 31-25-26 (Supp. 1985), repealed by Utah Laws,
Ch. 242, § 58.

It is clear that this paragraph was inserted in

the instruction solely for the improper purpose of emphasizing
uncharged civil misconduct in order to portray the Defendant in a
bad light.
Instruction No. 25 and the disturbing interaction between
these two improper and unlawful instructions is fully addressed
in Appellant's Brief.

Respondent's argument that Instruction No.

25 was properly given to "clarify11 anything (Br. of Resp. at p.
27) is simply not supported by a careful reading of this extremely misleading instruction.
The use of these instructions at trial provides a separate
and independent ground for reversal unrelated to the other issues
raised herein.
-21-

POINT VI
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS.
The State, in its Brief at Page 28 cites State v. Calamity,
735 P.2d 39, 43 (Utah 1987)-

The portion of that case cited by

the State simply holds that the terms "general and specific
intent" are no longer used in our statutory scheme and therefore,
instructions on the mental state required $hould be drawn to
enlighten the jury as to requirements of the current statute and
need not use the terms "general" or "specific" intent as terms of
art.

Nothing more was stated or implied by the statement quoted

by Respondent.

The Court in Calamity went on to identify the

required mental state for the crime and stated:
The trial court instructed the jury that
defendant could not be convicted unless he
acted intentionally or with knowledge. The
court then defined 'intentionally1 and
'knowingly.'
What is sought in the instant case is merely the same
thoroughness of instruction required in Calamity.
The holding that instructions need not be couched in terms
of "general" or "specific" intent does not change the requirement
that the jury must be properly instructed on all of the elements
of the crime.

The instruction given as number 14 cited by the

State contains the statutory elements defining purpose to deprive, but it does nothing to alert the jury that this is a
separate element of the crime.

-22-

Defendant's offered instructions merely state the necessity
of finding the required mental state as a separate element.

The

instructions given did not do this adequately and were therefore
inadequate to ensure that the jury was fully informed of the
requirement of adequate proof of mens rea.
Defendant's case depended partly upon his assertion that he
did not withdraw any funds with "purpose to deprive" any rightful
owner thereof.

Therefore, the Defendant's theory of the case was

not adequately presented to the jury by the instructions given.
"A defendant is entitled to have a jury instructed on his theory
of the case, if there be any substantial evidence to justify
giving the instruction."

State v. Castillo, 23 Utah 2d 70, 457

P.2d 618 (1969); Accord State v. Reedy, 681 P.2d 1251, 1252
(Utah 1984).

In the instant case not only was defendant's theory

of the case not properly presented, but the jury was not properly
instructed as to all the elements of the offense.

"An accurate

instruction on the basic elements of the offense charged is
essential, and failure to so instruct constitutes reversible
error."

State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33 (Utah 1980).

CONCLUSION
Respondent's Brief addresses only a selected few of the
numerous factual and legal issues raised and substantiated in
this appeal.

Even in those few issues. Defendant Crestani's

position is misstated or truncated.

The true facts of this case

establish overwhelmingly the constitutionally ineffective nature
of trial counsel's representation.
The deficiencies of representation described here are so
glaring that one could conclude that the trial was reduced to a
M

farce and a sham11, thus meeting even the more restrictive

standard of prior case law justifying a reversal of the
conviction.

There is no doubt that these deficiencies undermine

any confidence in the justness of the verdicts.
Having been deprived of his right to counsel vouchsafed by
the constitutions of the State of Utah and the United States,
Defendant Crestani is entitled to a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
DATED this ^ / ^ d a y of September, 1988
SESSIONS & MOORE

Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
James V. Crestani
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Gregory Brown
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231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
David L. Wilkinson
Attorney General
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ADDENDUM EXHIBIT A

MARTINEAU
& COMPANY
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF
CEHTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
UTAH ASSOCIATION OF
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
PRIVATE COMPANIES
PRACTICE SECTION
SEC PRACTICE SECTION

November 11, 1987
Mr. John F. Clark
Attorney at Law
Sessions & Moore
300 First Federal Plaza
505 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

Re:

James V. CrestanI

Dear John:
You have requested that we analyze certain records of James V.
Crestani
(hereinafter
CrestanI) and
Alta Title Company
(hereinafter Alta) to determine If there were funds in the
Alta MMD2 account which were, or CrestanI had reason to
believe were, CrestanI*s funds at or about the time funds were
withdrawn which Crestani was charged with theft for.
We reviewed all files In the Prosecutor's office, the evidence
files at the Clerk's office, files at Main Hurdman's office
and files at attorneys for the underwriter's office.
We also
received certain documentation In the form of microfilm copies
of checks, drafts and deposits of the MMD2 account from Sandy
State Bank.
We interviewed James V. Crestani, Vickie R.
(Peterson) Crestani (hereinafter Vickie), Ray D. Fry, Dick
Romono, a
private Investigator, and James A. Mclntyre,
attorney for
CrestanI, regarding
various documents and
chronology of events, while at the same time presenting them
with copies of documents and dates, in this case.
We also
discussed scope of audits, accounting detail and other matters
with prosecutors, accountants with Main Hurdman, attorneys and
certain customers of Alta.
We have relied upon these
conversations and Information which they gave us In arriving
at our conclusions.
When presented with specific documentation and correlated
chronology, Crestani's memory seemed to be prompted with
regard to the sequence of events and details of transactions
In this matter.
We will detail events and documentation in
relationship to each of the four (4) counts of theft.

John F. Clark
James V. CrestanI matter
November 11, 1987
The four Counts of theft were as follows
Count 1
May 7, 1982
Count 2
May 19, 1982
Count 3
June 11, 1982
Count 4
August 13, 1982

fc 4,000
20,000
16,800
16,500
457,300

We will address each count separately so as to show specific
funds which CrestanI believed were on deposit
In the MMD2
account at the time of the respective Withdrawals to show,
where applicable, specific correlations and/or cumulative
funds which CrestanI could have believed he was withdrawing.
Count 1:
On March 30, 1982, CrestanI deposited $15,000.00 into the MMD2
account (see Exhibit 1).
The money originated from life
insurance proceeds upon his mother's death.
The $15,000.00
was withdrawn from MMD2 account on the same day by draft
signed by Vickie R. Peterson and transferred to an Alta
account at Valley Bank & Trust Co.(Valley Bank)(see Exhibit
1A).
Vickie indicates Roger Piburn (Piburn) directed her to
withdraw the funds; CrestanI maintains he did not know the
funds were withdrawn.
On April 14, 1982, CrestanI deposited $19,896.73 Into the MMD2
account (see Exhibit 2 ) . The money originated from CrestanI's
account at Merrill Lynch.
CrestanI maintains he called Ron
Carnego, President of Sandy State Bank, and asked him how much
he had to deposit for 30 days to receive $20,000.00 at
Interest and that Is the amount he deposited for that purpose.
The $19,896.73 was withdrawn from MMD2 account on the same day
by draft signed by Vickie R. Peterson and transferred to an
Alta account at Valley Bank (see Exhibit 2A).
Vickie
indicates Piburn directed her to withdraw the funds; CrestanI
maintains he did not know the funds were withdrawn.
This reflects $34,896.73 was deposited into the MMD2 account
by or for CrestanI prior to the May 7, 1982 disbursement of
$4,000 (Count 1) which CrestanI maintains he thought was still
In the account on May 7, 1982. The entire $34,896.73 had been
withdrawn and transferred to an Alta account at Valley Bank by
that date.
Count 2:
The April 14, 1982, deposit referred to above of $19,896.73
(see Exhibit 2) was deposited Into MMD2 account by Crestani to
draw interest for one month. As of May 19, 1982, according to
Crestani 's recollection of his conversation with Ron Carnego,

John F. Clark
James V. CrestanI matter
November 11, 1987
It would have accumulated both principal and
Interest of
$20,000.00 (had it not been withdrawn) by May 19, 1982.
On May 4, 1982, Sandy State Bank credited $1,306.25 Into the
MMD2 account (see Exhibit 3) for interest earned for the month
of April, 1982.
This Is noted to show that interest was
credited to the account and would have accrued on the
$19,896.73, had It not been withdrawn.
On June 7, 1982, Sandy State Bank credited $402.52 into the
MMD2 account (see Exhibit 4) for interest earned for the month
of May, 1982.
This is noted for the same reason Indicated
above.
This reflects $34,896.73 was deposited Into the MMD2 account
(not including the Interest) by or for CrestanI prior to the
May 7, 1982 disbursement of $4,000.00 (Count 1) and May 19,
1982 disbursement of $20,000.00 (Count 2 ) .
The entire
$34,896.73 had been withdrawn and transferred to an Alta
account at Valley Bank by that date.
Count 3:
On June 4, 1982, Sandy State Bank credited $17,082.00 Into the
MMD2 account (see Exhibit 5) by mistake. The funds originated
from a personal loan CrestanI had made at Sandy State Bank
against a boat and should have been deposited
into CrestanI's
personal account at Sandy State Bank.
When the bank called
CrestanI on June 11, 1982 to advise him his personal account
was overdrawn, he advised them of the deposit from the loan,
they discovered the error, and he stopped by the bank to sign
a "counter check" to transfer the funds to his personal
account, taking $800.00 of cash from the funds and depositing
$16,000.00 into his personal account. On June 10, 1982, (the
day before) the $17,082.00 was withdrawn from MMD2 by draft
signed by Vickie R. Peterson and transferred to an Alta
account at Valley Bank (see Exhibit 5A).
Vickie Indicates
PIburn directed her to withdraw the funds; CrestanI maintains
he did not know the funds were withdrawn.
This reflects that $51,978.73 was deposited
Into the MMD2
account (not
including Interest) by or for CrestanI prior to
the Counts 1, 2 and 3 disbursements totalling $40,800.00 as of
June 11, 1982.
The entire $51,978.73 had been withdrawn and
transferred to an Alta account at Valley Bank by that date.
Count 4:
On June 24, 1982, James A. Mclntyre, attorney for CrestanI,
deposited $30,000.00
Into the MMD2 account for Crestani (see
Exhibit 6 ) .
The funds originated
from CrestanI's trust

4
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account with Mclntyre's firm.
On June

28, 1982, Crestanl

deposited

$24,622.50

into the

MMD2

account (see Exhibit 7 ) .
The funds originated from a loan
repayment from Ray D. Fry to Crestanl of $24,000.00 plus
Interest.
We found no records to indicate the above two deposits
totalling $54,622.50
were ever withdrawn from the MMD2
account, except for the $16,500 withdrawal on August 13, 1982
(Count 4) up to and Including the time In March, 1983 when
Alta closed.
Other deposits:
On August 5, 1982, James A. Mclntyre, attorney for Crestanl,
deposited $50,000.00 for Crestanl into what Mclntyre described
as the "escrow" account at Sandy State Bank (see Exhibit 10).
It should have been deposited
into MMD2 per Crestanl#s
instructions to Mclntyre, but was deposited to "Alta Title
Company Contract Servicing Account"
instead.
We found no
records to Indicate the. above deposit of $50,000.00 was ever
withdrawn from Alta up to and
including the time in March,
1983 when Alta closed.
Although we discovered other deposits made
Into Alta by
Crestanl subsequent to the above transactions, they have not
been included herein because we were not able, because of time
restraints, to obtain adequate documentation for inclusion
here!n.
The above information reflects that $106,601.23 was deposited
into the MMD2 account
(not
including
interest) by or for
Crestanl which were, or Crestanl had reason to believe were,
Crestanl's funds at or about the time funds were withdrawn
which Crestanl was charged with theft for. Counts 1, 2, 3 and
4 totalled $57,300.00 as of August 13, 1982. In addition, the
$50,000.00 deposit on August 5, 1982
should have been
deposited Into MMD2 for Crestanl, the two amounts totalling
$156,601.23. Three withdrawals totalling $51,978.73 were made
and transferred to an Alta account at V a M e y Bank which
Crestanl maintains he did not know about.
In addition,
Crestanl made two withdrawals totalling $33,300.00.
The
combined withdrawals total $85,278.73.
This leaves a balance of $21,322.50 In the MMD2 account which
was apparently not withdrawn (not Including
Interest) and a
balance of $71,322.50, including the $50,000.00 deposit of
August 5, 1982, which went Into an Alta account at Sandy State
Bank .

John F. Clark
James V. Crestanl matter
November 11, 1987

We are available to review this
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information.
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November 16, 1987

Mr. John F. Clark, Esq.
Attorney at Law
Sessions & Moore
300 First Federal Plaza
505 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Re:

James V, Crestanl - Supplemental Report

Dear John:

e/e-fr-"*7'*

This supplements our report of November 11, 1987,
11, 1987 report was Issued we found
Since the November
explanatIon for the June 24, 1982 deposit in the amount of
These funds were disbursed out of the MMD2
$30,000.00.
account at or about the time of the deposit and were therefore
not on deposit at the time of the August 13, 1987 disbursement
of $16,500.00 (Count 4 ) .
In the November
11, 1987 report, page 4, next to last
paragraph, next to last sentence, reads as follows; "Three
wtlhdrawals totalling $51,978.73 were made and transferred to
an Alta account at Valley Bank which Crestanl maintains he did
not know about" (emphasis by undersigned). We wish to clarify
that Crestanl knew about the Valley Bank account; maintains he
did not know about the three withdrawals referred to.
Also subsequent to our November 11
1987 report we found
additional evidence
that Crestanl had funds which were
deposited into Alta accounts upon which Crestanl would have
been able to draw which were totally unrelated to any
"escrowed funds" belonging to customers or depositors of Alta,
as foI lows:
In September, 1981, Crestanl sold the Alta Title Building
located on the corner of 200 West Fourth South, Salt Lake
City, Utah.
The sales price was $1,350,000.00 with a
$350,000.00 down payment; the
mortgage of approximately
$750,000.00 was paid off by the buyer, and the balance of

Mr, John F. Clark, Esq.
James V. CrestanI - Supplemental
November 16, 1987
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Report

approximately $250,000.00 was due In monthly payments with a
balloon payment
In September, 1982. After commissions and
other selling costs, the net cash to CrestanI
In September,
1981 was
approximately $300,000.00, which, according to
CrestanI was deposited
Into Alta or
Into Mclntyre's trust
account for CrestanI's benefit.
According to CrestanI the
balloon payment due In September, 1982 was also deposited Into
Alta or Mclntyre's trust account for CrestanI's benefit. This
would have resulted
In over $500,000.00 of funds being
available to CrestanI which did not originate from MMD2 or any
other "escrowed funds" at Alta.
On September 28, 1982, CrestanI deposited $8,865.43 Into the
MMD2 account. According to CrestanI the funds originated from
a loan repayment from Ray D. Fry to CrestanI out of the 5300
South Partnership closing.
Because of time constraints we were unable to verify all of
the above Information, however our search for and of the Alta
records continues.
We believe that our reports contradict the Prosecution's
position that "there is no real evidence that the money did
not come out of the MMD2 account and the money was merely
being replaced Into the original account", so far as the
$24,622.50 deposit of June 28, 1982 and the $8,865,43 deposit
of September 28, 1982 are concerned.
The funds derived from
the sale of the Alta Title Building were also obviously not
those of customers or depositors of Alta.
The above Information, as It supplements our report of
November 11, 1987, reflects that CrestanI had deposited funds
Into MMD2 account in excess of the funds withdrawn (Counts 1
through 4) Including the September 28, 1982 deposit of
$8,865.43. The $50,000.00 deposit of August 5, 1982, and over
$500,000.00 In proceeds from the Building sale were additional
funds available to CrestanI.
As to the question asked us as to "whether or not there were
funds In the Alta MMD2 account which were, or CrestanI had
reason to believe were, CrestanI's funds at or about the time
funds were withdrawn which CrestanI was charged with theft
for", we advise you and the Court that no one can answer that
question accurately at this time. Because there were over
$4,400,000.00 In deposits Into the MMD2 account classified as
"repurchase agreement" funds, and multiple transfers from the
general Alta account and the MMD1 account, and many transfers
from the MMD2 account
into the Valley Bank escrow account, a
full and complete accounting of a I\ transactions must be made
before anyone can answer this question accurately. This has

Mr. John F. Clark, r
James V. Crestani'^ * G
November 16, 1987
°u&0i
never been done!
SIncerely,
MARTINEAU & COMPANY

A. MartIneau,\CPA
ling Partner
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